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era: an institutional-analytical
explanation of inflation and the
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MARK SETTERFIELD∗
Department of Economics, Trinity College, Hartford, CT and Associate Member Cambridge
Centre for Economic and Public Policy, Cambridge University. Email: mark.setterfield@trincoll.edu

Abstract: This paper is based on the premise that at any point in time,
macroeconomic performance is best understood in terms of certain ‘fundamental’
features of the income-generating process that are embedded in a relatively
enduring institutional framework, that both affects and is affected by
macroeconomic outcomes themselves. This results in the evolution of capitalist
economies through a succession of discrete, medium-term episodes of
macroeconomic performance. The purpose of the paper is to apply this vision to
the explanation of inflation and the functional distribution of income in the
post-war US economy. A conflicting claims model of inflation is developed, in
which inflation is the result of conflict over the functional distribution of income.
It is then shown how an account of the different, relatively enduring institutions
within which this ‘fundamental’ macroeconomic process has been embedded over
the past 50 years can be used to calibrate the analytical model, giving rise to an
explanation of inflation and the functional distribution of income in the US as
having evolved through three discrete episodes. Moreover, once the institutional
context of macroeconomic performance is properly recognized in this manner,
inflation and the functional distribution of income in the US over the past 50
years are seen to be explained by the rise, decline, and rise of successive incomes
policies.

1. Introduction
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the US economy experienced rates of inflation
quite unlike those encountered either before or since. The annual average rate of
inflation, which had been 3.1% for 1960–73, more than doubled to 7.1% during
the period 1974–89, before falling back to 3.1% between 1990 and 2000. The
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current conventional wisdom is that this pattern of first low, then high, then
low inflation during the post-war period is best explained by monetary policy
shocks that created a ‘great inflation’ during the 1970s/1980s. These shocks are
attributed either to deliberate policy interventions motivated by the desire to
avoid recession in the real economy, or else some form of honest mistake, such
as an inability to accurately estimate the natural rate of unemployment, or a
failure to obey the ‘Taylor principle’ when adjusting nominal interest rates in
response to changes in expected inflation.1
Despite superficial differences, the common core of all variants of the
conventional wisdom outlined above is that inflation is exclusively caused by
excess aggregate demand in an economy characterized by a unique and stable
supply-determined equilibrium rate of unemployment. The thesis advanced in
this paper departs radically from this common core, positing that inflation
is rooted in conflict over the distribution of income in a demand-determined
economy that displays no propensity to gravitate towards any pre-determined
(on the supply-side) equilibrium rate of unemployment. Nor is the economy
understood to be structurally self-regulating. Specifically, it is held that capitalist
economies do not automatically create the institutional structures necessary to
permit reconciliation of low rates of inflation with low unemployment and
high growth. Rather, at any point in time, the ‘fundamental’ properties of the
inflation process rooted in conflict over the distribution of income are embedded
in a historically specific institutional framework. Together, these constitute a
macroeconomic regime that, at any point in time, will give rise to conditional
equilibrium inflation outcomes. The latter are conditional in the specific sense
that they depend on the reproduction over time of the particular institutional
framework within which the ‘fundamentals’ of the inflation process are currently
embedded. Since institutions are relatively inert and enduring, the conditional
equilibrium inflation rates described above will also endure, becoming part of
discrete, medium-run episodes of macroeconomic performance.2
But institutions are not immutable – they can, and do, change over time. This
change in the institutional structure of the economy will give rise to (inter alia)
change in the conditional equilibrium rate of inflation. It is thus institutional
change that this paper seeks to associate with the variations in the US inflation
1 See, for example, Collard and Dellas (2004) for a summary and assessment of this conventional
wisdom. See also Orphanides and Williams (2004) on the ‘natural rate misperception’ theory of the
great inflation, and Clarida et al. (2000) for discussion of the importance of the Taylor principle for
providing a nominal anchor (i.e., a determinate equilibrium rate of inflation) for the economy. The
‘honest mistake’ hypothesis is currently popular amongst advocates of the new consensus/new neoclassical
synthesis macroeconomics (on which see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999).
2 The notion of a medium run is not, as yet, an established feature of most macroeconomic analysis,
but evidence strongly suggests that a salient characteristic of contemporary capitalism is discrete phases
or episodes of better or worse macroeconomic performance lasting several consecutive business cycles.
See, for example, Cornwall and Cornwall (2001).
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rate identified earlier. Specifically, the thesis advanced is that during the post-war
period, the inflation experience of the US economy has reflected the rise, decline,
and rise of successive incomes policies, where the latter are defined as formal
and/or informal institutions that frame and mediate aggregate wage and price
setting behaviour in such a way as to reduce conflict over income shares and
better reconcile conflicting income claims.3 Conventional wisdom would have
it that incomes policies experienced only a brief – and unsuccessful – trial as
an anti-inflation device during the early 1970s.4 But the argument developed
here is that the two low inflation episodes during recent US macroeconomic
history correspond precisely to the operation of two successful (in terms of their
capacity to reduce inflation) but structurally very different incomes policies, with
the high inflation interlude during the 1970s and 1980s – including the period
that conventional wisdom identifies with the brief and unsuccessful adoption of
incomes policies – constituting an inter-regnum.
In order to develop this argument more fully, the remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the methodology on which the
paper is based. Section 3 then constructs a conflicting-claims model of inflation
that is consistent with the ‘fundamentals’ of the inflation process identified
in Section 2. In Section 4, the conflicting claims model is ‘calibrated’ on the
basis of both quantitative and qualitative information about the successive (and
different) institutional frameworks within which it has been embedded over the
past half century. It is shown that the conditional equilibrium outcomes of the
resulting model can be used to successfully explain the evolution of inflation
and the wage share of income in the US over three successive episodes of
macroeconomic performance (1960–73, 1974–89, and 1990–2000) and that
this, in turn, substantiates the claim that the post-war US economy has been
characterized by the rise, decline, and rise of successive incomes policies. Finally,
Section 5 offers some conclusions.

3 It is important to note that this definition of incomes policies is broader than that conventionally
adopted, in which incomes policies are identified exclusively with formal institutions (i.e., laws – see, for
example, Hunt, 2002). The definition above does not preclude formal institutions from contributing to
the constitution of an incomes policy (nor, in principle, does it identify the state as a necessary participant
in the construction of an incomes policy), but is designed to acknowledge the important role that informal
institutions (including social norms and conventions) are also likely to play in any set of arrangements
that successfully ameliorates distributional conflict.
Note also that, as will become clear in what follows, incomes policies that conform to the broad
definition introduced above can be – and have, in fact, been – either ‘cooperative’ or ‘coercive’. In
other words, incomes policies do not always ameliorate distributional conflict in ways that are mutually
acceptable to all parties. In this way, the precise structure of an incomes policy can be thought of as
codifying the distribution of bargaining power in the economy.
4 Of course, this conventional wisdom owes, in part, to the narrower definition of incomes policies
that it adopts, as a result of which incomes policies are identified purely with formal institutions and are
thus, by definition, generally conspicuous by their absence.

130

MARK SETTERFIELD

2. Methodology
As suggested above, and following Setterfield and Cornwall (2002), the basic
vision of the economy on which this paper rests involves certain ‘fundamental’
principles of the inflation process embedded in a historically specific institutional
framework that impinges upon the process of aggregate wage and price
setting. A fundamental refers to ‘a proposition that we take as basic to the
functioning of capitalism, regardless of the precise . . . [inflation] episode that we
are dealing with’ (Setterfield and Cornwall, 2002: 70). In the current context,
our fundamentals can be reduced to the following propositions:
(a) Conflict over the distribution of income is central to the process of inflation.
Contrary to the view that inflation is exclusively the product of excess
aggregate demand, we regard inflation as the result of the irreconcilable
demands of different social groups on real output, inflation being what results
when these conflicting claims are expressed in nominal terms, as in a moneyusing economy.
(b) Both the power of workers vis-à-vis the wage bargain and the power of firms
vis-à-vis the goods market are incomplete. In other words, neither workers nor
firms can fully index their expectations or aspirations into wages and prices.
(c) Workers and firms bargain over the determination of the nominal wage,
following which firms set prices (and hence the value of the real wage). This
is consistent with the first principles of a money-using economy as articulated
by Keynes (1936: ch. 2), and rules out the idea that workers and firms enter
into direct negotiations concerning the size of the real wage (as in a barter
system).

These fundamentals, together with the institutional framework within which
they are embedded, allow us to identify three ‘regimes’ on which the analysis of
inflation can then be based. The wage and price regimes identify the determinants
of the rate of growth of nominal wages and prices, respectively, in a manner
consistent with the fundamentals of the inflation process identified above. As
will become clear in the following section, these regimes can be summarized in
terms of a conflicting claims model of inflation.5 Finally, the institutional regime
is:
a relatively enduring macro-institutional structure within which economic
behaviour takes place. It constitutes the ‘operating system’ that provides the
social infrastructure necessary, in an environment of uncertainty and conflict,
to create stability, undergird the state of long run expectations, [define and]

5 See, for example, Burdekin and Burkett (1996) and Lavoie (1992: ch. 7) for surveys of the conflicting
claims approach.
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reconcile competing distributional demands, and hence facilitate economic
activity amongst decentralized decision makers.6
(Setterfield and Cornwall, 2002: 71)

In other words, the institutional regime creates ‘conditional closure’ in an
otherwise open economic system (Setterfield, 2003).7 Closure is again conditional
in the specific sense that it depends on the reproduction over time of a set
of relatively enduring – but ultimately transmutable – institutions. Like the
institutions from which it derives, of course, conditional closures are also
relatively enduring. Hence combination of the wage, price and institutional
regimes – which together comprise the macroeconomic regime alluded to
earlier – permits identification of actual inflation outcomes, which emerge as
relatively enduring, conditional equilibrium values characteristic of a discrete
episode of macroeconomic performance.8 Once again, the conditionality of
these equilibrium values stems from the fact that they are contingent on the
reproduction over time of a relatively enduring – but ultimately transmutable –
institutional regime.9
In what lies ahead, we first develop a conflicting claims model of inflation to
represent the wage and price regimes described above. We then identify three
distinct institutional regimes in the post-war US economy, and show how the use
of these institutional regimes to ‘calibrate’ the wage and price regimes explains
the inflation experience of the US economy described in the introduction as
three distinct episodes of macroeconomic performance associated with the rise,
decline, and rise of successive incomes policies.
3. Modelling the wage and price regimes: a conflicting-claims model of inflation
The wage and price regimes described in the previous section are captured by the
following equations, which together comprise the basis of a conflicting-claims
model of inflation
w = µ1 (ωw − ω) + µ2 q + µ3 p e , 0 < µi < 1 ∀i

(1)

6 As will become clear in what follows, the constituents of the institutional regime that are the focus
of attention in this particular paper include, inter alia, labour law, the norms and rules of the industrial
relations system, and conventions governing the behaviour and interaction of firms in product markets.
7 See also Crotty (1994) on the conceptually similar notion of conditional stability in macro systems.
8 See Setterfield (1997) on the notion of conditional equilibrium, and Chick and Caserta (1997) on
the related notion of provisional equilibrium.
9 The blend of formal modelling and institutional detail that ultimately furnishes an explanation
of observed macroeconomic outcomes in this approach might be regarded as an analytical institutional
economics and/or as a branch of analytical political economy (Dutt, 1994; Setterfield, 2005). The approach
certainly has obvious antecedents in the work of the social structure of accumulation and regulation
theories (see, for example, Kotz et al., 1994 and Boyer, 1990, respectively), structuralist macroeconomics
(see, for example, Taylor, 2004) and the work of post-Keynesians such as Cornwall (1990) and Cornwall
and Cornwall (2001).
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p = ϕ (ω − ωF ) + w − q , 0 < ϕ < 1

(2)

where w denotes the rate of growth of nominal wages, ωW is the target wage
share of workers, ω is the actual wage share, q is labour productivity growth,
pe and p denote the expected and actual rates of inflation, respectively, and ωF
is the target wage share of firms, where ωW > ωF by assumption. Equation (1)
represents the wage regime, describing the rate of growth of nominal wages as
a function of the difference between workers’ target wage share and the actual
wage share (the former representing their distributional aspirations), the rate
of productivity growth, and expected inflation (both of which, ceteris paribus,
will affect the wage share unless the nominal wage is adjusted in compensating
fashion).10 The parameters µi are determined by the relative power of workers
vis-à-vis firms in the wage bargain. We need not always observe µi = µj , however,
since, for any given degree of bargaining power, workers may expend more or
less effort on, for example, ensuring that w responds to pe as opposed to other
variables in (1).11 Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity we will assume that µi =
µj for all i, j in what follows, so that we can write the wage regime as
w = µ [(ωw − ω) + q + p e ]

(1a)

Note also that
µ = µ (U , S) , µU , µS < 0

(3)

ωW = ω (U , S, Z) , ωU < 0

(4)

and

where U denotes the rate of unemployment, S denotes institutional features of
the labour market and industrial relations system that diminish the ability and/or
willingness of workers to press for nominal wage increases,12 and Z is a vector of
other variables that affects workers’ perceptions of a fair wage share (including,
for example, historical experience). Equation (3) states that the extent to which
workers index expected inflation, productivity growth, and disparities between
their preferred wage share and the actual wage share into nominal wage growth
varies inversely with the rate of unemployment and the institutional determinants
10 This is evident from the definition of the wage share, ω = WN/PQ, where W is the nominal wage,
N the level of employment, P the price level, and Q denotes aggregate output. If P rises or N/Q (the
reciprocal of the level of labour productivity) falls, ω will fall unless these changes are offset by a rise
in W.
11 This is consistent with the notion that workers may pay more or less attention to inflation
expectations in the process of wage bargaining, depending on the size of the expected inflation rate.
See, for example, Palley (2006) and Akerlof (2002).
12 The value of S will therefore be influenced by such concrete institutions as labour law, the degree
to which collective bargaining is centralized, the extent to which consultation is a normal feature of
the employment relationship, the extent to which practices such as downsizing, outsourcing or plant
relocation are conventional features of firm behaviour, and so forth.
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of the ability and/or willingness of workers to press for nominal wage increases.
Equation (4), meanwhile, is based on the work of Setterfield and Lovejoy (2006)
who, following Kahneman et al. (1986), postulate that aspirations are influenced
by multiple objective ‘reference points’ based on salient past and present events.
In the case of ωW in equation (4), these reference points include both U and
S. Hence workers’ wage share aspirations are inversely related to the rate of
unemployment on the basis of the hypothesis that a paucity of employment
opportunities diminishes workers’ subjective sense of self-worth. At the same
time, ωW is affected by the institutions that comprise S, although the sign of ωS
is ambiguous. This is because the impact of S on worker aspirations will depend
upon the character of the precise institutional regime within which the wage and
price regimes above are embedded, and thus cannot be determined a priori.13
The full significance of equations (3) and (4) will become more evident in Section
4 below.
Equation (2) captures the price regime, describing the rate of inflation as
depending upon the rate of growth of unit labour costs (w − q) and the difference
between the actual wage share and firms’ target wage share. The parameter ϕ is
determined by the state of competition in product markets and the corresponding
ability of firms to mark up prices in excess of the average costs of production.14
Indeed, the price regime in equation (2) is essentially a dynamic version of a
standard mark-up pricing equation in which the mark up (and hence ωF ) is
determined by the target rate of return on firms’ assets.15 To see this, note that
by definition
r=

(1 − ω) u
v

where r is the rate of profit, (1 − ω) is the profit share, u is the rate of capacity
utilization, and v is the fixed capital–output ratio derived from the production
technology. It follows that
rT =

(1 − ωF ) un
v

13 Particularly important is the extent to which the institutional regime encourages workers to perceive
the employment relationship as either one of ‘social partnership’ or ‘employer unilateralism’ – which
will either raise or lower workers’ subjective sense of self-worth, respectively. See Setterfield and Lovejoy
(2006) for further discussion of the determinants of workers’ aspirations and for a fuller account of the
ambiguous sign of ωS .
14 In this way, ϕ is analogous to Kalecki’s (1971) degree of monopoly, and will therefore be influenced
by factors such as the concentration of domestic markets, overhead costs, the price elasticity of demand
for final output and the amount of international competition faced by firms. Some of these same factors
may influence the target rate of return on firms’ assets and hence, as demonstrated immediately below,
the value of ωF .
15 See Lee (1998: 206) for discussion of the prevalence of target rate of return pricing amongst business
enterprises.
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or
ωF = 1 −

rT v
un

where rT denotes the target rate of return established by firms and un is the normal
rate of capacity utilization at which this target rate of return is calculated.
It is worth remarking at this point on the fidelity of the wage and price regimes
above to the fundamentals identified in the previous section. Hence note that
distributional conflict is made central to the inflation process by the dependence
of w and p on ωW and ωF , where ωW > ωF . Meanwhile, the assumptions that µ,
ϕ < 1 are consistent with the claim that workers’ power vis-à-vis the wage bargain
and firms’ power vis-à-vis the goods market is incomplete; neither workers nor
firms are capable of fully indexing all of the determinants of w or p into nominal
wage growth or price inflation, respectively. Finally, the principle that workers
and firms bargain over the nominal wage, with the real wage determined only
once prices have been set in the goods market, is captured by the facts that
(1a) explicitly describes a nominal wage setting process and that despite the fact
that nominal wage growth is influenced by productivity growth and expected
inflation in (1a), the actual rate of growth of the real wage is always determined
in (2) as
w − p = −ϕ (ω − ωF ) + q
As discussed in the previous section, the specific conditional equilibrium
outcomes that will emerge from the model under construction here cannot
be identified unless we first specify the institutional regime within which the
wage and price regimes are embedded and which, by determining the values of
variables such as S, creates conditional closure within the model. Nevertheless,
it is possible at this stage to identify certain general conditions necessary for any
specific conditional equilibrium to emerge within this model, and to explore the
consequences of these conditions for the wage and price regimes described above.
These conditions include the realization of inflation expectations (p = pe ) and
constancy of the wage share over time (which, from the definition of the wage
share, implies that p = w − q). Combining both of these general equilibrium
conditions with (1a) yields
w=

µ
(ωW − ω)
1−µ

(5)

whilst combining the second with equation (2) yields
ω = ωF

(6)

We can now utilize the information in (5) and (6) to deduce certain general
properties that will be characteristic of any specific conditional equilibrium values
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of w, p, and ω that we subsequently derive. Hence denoting an equilibrium value
with an asterisk, it follows directly from (6) that
ω∗ = ωF

(7)

In other words, the equilibrium value of ω is ultimately determined in the
goods market and by the aspirations of firms – independently of µ and ωW (the
bargaining power and aspirations of workers) in the wage bargain.16 Meanwhile,
substituting (7) into (5) we arrive at
µ
w∗ =
(8)
(ωW − ωF )
1−µ
from which, given the general equilibrium condition p = w − q, it follows that
µ
(9)
p∗ =
(ωW − ωF ) − q
1−µ
where q denotes the (assumed given) trend rate of productivity growth.17
Equations (8) and (9) describe the equilibrium rates of growth of nominal wages
and prices as functions of workers’ bargaining power and the ‘aspiration gap’
ωW − ωF (the difference between workers’ and firms’ wage share targets).
Two further key results emerge from equations (8) and (9). The first is that
w∗ and p∗ are both increasing in µ. To see this, note that
∂w∗
∂p ∗
ωW − ωF
=
=
>0
∂µ
∂µ
(1 − µ)2

(10)

Other things being equal, the equilibrium rates of wage and price inflation will
vary directly with the bargaining power of workers. Second, both w∗ and p∗ are
increasing in the ‘aspiration gap’ ωW − ωF . Hence
∂w∗
∂p ∗
µ
>0
=
=
∂ (ωW − ωF )
∂ (ωW − ωF )
1−µ

(11)

Other things being equal, any increase in ωW or any decrease in ωF will raise the
equilibrium rates of wage and price inflation, and vice versa.18
16 There may, in principle, be circumstances in which µ and ωW affect ωF (i.e., ωF may not ultimately
be set autonomously by firms) – on which, see Section 4 below. But this interaction is not systematic in
the model developed above.
17 It is possible, of course, that the distribution of income will interact with the rate of productivity
growth. For example, a wage share that falls far short of ωW may be perceived as unjust by workers
and trigger adverse efficiency wage effects. Alternatively, the equilibrium wage share may influence the
nature and extent of technical progress by placing more or less pressure on firms to innovate in order
to raise profits. Finally, in a demand-led growth environment, changes in the wage share may affect the
rate of growth of real output and hence the rate of growth of productivity via the Verdoorn Law. By
treating productivity growth as given, we are abstracting from these plausible interactions for the sake of
simplicity.
18 The fact that p∗ is sensitive to ωF demonstrates that inflation can be firm-induced in the model above.
For example, if an increase in commodity prices were to squeeze net profit margins, and if this led firms to
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Figure 1. Conflicting-claims inflation
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The wage and price regimes in equations (5) and (6) together with the
general equilibrium condition p = w − q are illustrated in Figure 1, which
depicts an imagined conditional equilibrium configuration corresponding to
some (unspecified) institutional regime.19
Having thus specified wage and price regimes consistent with the fundamentals
identified in the previous section, and having identified certain general
equilibrium properties of these regimes, we are now in a position to ‘calibrate’
the resulting model using information about institutions. This will enable us
to show how changes in the institutional regime of the US economy over the
past 50 years have resulted in the evolution of the US economy through several
successive episodes of macroeconomic performance – an evolution that, in terms
of its impact on the variables of interest here, can ultimately be interpreted in
terms of the rise, decline, and rise of successive incomes policies. It is to this task
that we now turn.

raise their target rate of return rT in an effort to restore net profitability, the result would be an increase
in ωF (appealing to the dependence of ωF on rT demonstrated earlier) and hence, via (9), p∗ .
19 Following Kregel (1976), Figure 1 simply assumes a given value of S, making no effort to explain
the value of this variable and ‘locking up without ignoring’ its capacity to change over time. This creates
an ‘artificial’ closure designed to highlight features of our model associated with its fundamentals, rather
than with the precise institutional regime within which these are, at any point in time, embedded. Notice,
however, that the wage and price regimes described in this section and summarized in Figure 1 inevitably
pre-empt the role of institutions in the model developed here. For example, the pricing behaviour assumed
to justify the form of the price regime in equation (2) is, itself, properly understood as a conventional
rather than ‘natural’ feature of the economy.
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Table 1. US macroeconomic performance since 1960

INFLATION1
WAGE SHARE2
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH3
UNEMPLOYMENT4
WORKER INSECURITY5

1960–73

1974–79

1980–89

1990–2000

3.1
57.4
3.1
4.9
N/A

9.6
59.1
1.3
6.8
0.21

5.6
58.4
1.6
7.3
0.57

3.1
57.7
2.0
5.6
0.82

Notes: 1. Percentage rate of change of the CPI, all items, Economic Report of the President, 2004: 357.
2. Compensation of employees as a percentage of Gross Domestic Income, Bureau of Economic Analysis
National and Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.11 (www.bea.doc.gov)
3. Percentage rate of change of output per hour of all persons, business sector, Economic Report of the
President, 2004: 343.
4. Unemployed persons as a percentage of the civilian labour force, Economic Report of the President,
2004: 334.
5. Index of worker insecurity (Setterfield, 2005).

4. The rise, decline and rise of incomes policies in the US
Table 1 presents the stylized facts of US macroeconomic performance over the
past four decades. The first row of Table 1 clearly illustrates the ‘low–high–
low’ evolution of inflation since 1960, two episodes of low inflation (1960–73
and 1990–2000) separated by the high inflation interlude of the 1974–89
period. Table 1 also reveals the extent to which this episodic behaviour
of inflation has been accompanied by similarly episodic behaviour in other
macroeconomic variables. Hence roughly comparable values of the wage share,
rate of productivity growth, and unemployment rate during the periods 1960–
73 and 1990–2000 are separated by a rise in the wage share, a marked decline
in the rate of productivity growth and a marked increase in the unemployment
rate 1974–89.20 In this section, we will argue that the stylized facts in Table 1
can be understood as a series of episodic macroeconomic outcomes associated
with three qualitatively different macroeconomic regimes, the defining feature of
each of which has been the institutional regime within which the wage and price
regimes outlined in Section 3 were embedded.
A common theme in political economy identifies the post-war Golden Age
(1948–73) with a historic compromise between capital and labour, as a result
of which the distributional goals of workers and firms were (at least partially)
reconciled (Bowles et al., 1990; Cornwall, 1990; Glyn et al., 1990; Cornwall and
Cornwall, 2001). This ‘value sharing’ norm of distributive justice is understood
to have been codified in the form of ‘social bargains’, under the terms of
20 Note that from 1995–2000, the average annual rate of unemployment in the US fell to 4.8%, slightly
below its 1960–73 value. The annual average rate of productivity growth rose slightly to 2.3% during
the same period – considerably below its 1960–73 value, but comparable to its value of 2.5% during the
Golden Age as a whole (Maddison, 1991: 51).
We return to discuss the significance of the fifth row of Table 1 below.
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which firms retained the ‘right to manage’ in return for commitment to a
high and stable wage share of income and annual growth in real earnings.
The social bargains were not uniform across capitalist economies, being more
highly developed in northern Europe and Japan than in the Anglo-Saxon
economies (Cornwall, 1990).21 Hence the US achieved only a ‘limited capitallabour accord’ (Bowles et al., 1990) during the Golden Age. Nevertheless,
by better reconciling the distributional conflict at the heart of the inflation
process, social bargains – even in the limited form found in the US – had
a beneficial impact on the unemployment and growth performances of the
advanced capitalist economies (Bowles et al., 1990; Cornwall, 1990; Glyn et al.,
1990; Cornwall and Cornwall, 2001; Setterfield and Cornwall, 2002). In keeping
with this theme, the position adopted here is that the limited capital–labour
accord created an institutional regime that explains the precise constellation
of macroeconomic outcomes in the first column of Table 1, as a discrete
episode of US macroeconomic performance characterized by high growth, low
unemployment, and low rates of inflation. More precisely, the limited capital–
labour accord in the US constituted an incomes policy in the sense defined earlier,
raising the value of S in equation (3) by reducing the willingness of workers
to press for nominal wage increases purely on the basis of the market power
vested in them by a low rate of unemployment.22 This alleviated the inflation
constraint on the US economy (the need to sacrifice growth and employment
by raising U in order to lower µ and ωW in equations (3) and (4), and
hence reduce inflation in equation (9)), facilitating, in turn, the reconciliation
of rapid growth and low unemployment with low rates of inflation –
precisely the triad observed in the first column of Table 1.
After 1968, however, the social bargains described above began to unravel
and – along with the value-sharing norm of distributive justice on which they
were based – had broken down altogether by 1973 (Bowles et al., 1990;
Cornwall, 1990; Cornwall and Cornwall, 2001). Rather than being based on
compromise and reconciliation, the early 1970s witnessed the emergence of a
‘market power’ approach to industrial relations, the embodiment of a ‘winner
take all’ norm of distributive justice. These developments were associated in
the first instance with ‘aspiration inflation’ on the part of labour, emanating
both from materially secure workers who had grown accustomed to the
experience of full employment and steadily rising real incomes during the
Golden Age (Cornwall, 1990), and from ‘new’ workers (including women and
minorities) who had not benefitted from the spoils of the post-war social bargains
21 According to Cornwall (1990), this lack of uniformity explains differences in macroeconomic
performance amongst advanced capitalist economies during the Golden Age.
22 Setterfield and Lovejoy (2006) argue that the participatory and conciliatory nature of social bargains
is such that we can expect to observe ωS > 0 in equation (4). Their empirical evidence, however, is
consistent with the view that the net effect of social bargains on inflation (given that µS < 0 in (3)) was
negative.
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Figure 2. The breakdown of social bargains
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(Bowles et al., 1990).23,24 These institutional changes – together with their
implications for inflation – are illustrated in Figure 2. Replicating the
configuration illustrated in Figure 1 and treating this as a stylized representation
of the Golden Age macroeconomic regime, Figure 2 then shows an increase

) consistent with the
in the target wage share of workers (from ωW to ωW
aspiration inflation described above. Other things being equal, and in line with
equation (11), this worsened inflationary pressures resulting from conflict over
the distribution of income. However, and again in a manner congruent with
equation (11), Figure 2 shows these inflationary pressures being moderated
somewhat by a discrete increase in the target wage share of firms (from ωF
23 According to Bowles et al. (1990: 67–69), income and employment disparities between white males
on one hand, and women and racial minorities on the other, widened considerably in the US from 1948–
66. These disparities, they argue, fueled the civil rights and women’s movements during the 1960s and had
a direct effect on the subsequent legislative attention paid to issues such as affirmative action. In keeping
with equation (4), we posit that these latter developments – as a component of the vector Z – enhanced
the subjective sense of self-worth of women and minority workers, raising their income share aspirations.
Note that since ωW = ωM + ωWM , where ωM is the target income share of white male workers and ωWM
is the target income share of women and minorities, then ceteris paribus, any increase in ωWM will raise
ωW . If an increase in ωWM also triggers intra-class conflict, causing ωM to rise as white male workers seek
to preserve their share of total wage income, then there will be a second, indirect, effect of any increase
in ωWM on ωW .
24 As will become clear in what follows, capital and the state were quick to respond in kind to this
aspiration inflation and its consequences. Indeed, their reactions have become the enduring hallmark of
the post-1973 ‘winner take all’ norm of distributive justice and attendant ‘market power’ approach to
addressing the conflicting distributional goals of workers and firms.
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to ωF ). The hypothesis here is that this development was related in the first
instance to the increased international competition faced by US firms by the end
of the 1960s, the most obvious manifestation of which was the disappearance
by the early 1970s of the US trade surplus.25 This resulted in a second
important institutional change – a decrease in the value of ϕ (US firms ‘degree of
monopoly’) in equation (2). Recall that ϕ itself has no systematic impact on the
equilibrium inflation or distributional outcomes in equations (7)–(9). However,
the discretionary increase in firms’ target wage share depicted in Figure 2 is
entertained here as being the result of particular historical circumstances –
specifically, the combination of pressures on firms emanating from product
markets (as captured by the diminution of their ‘degree of monopoly’, ϕ) resulting
in a need to limit price increases, even as the rate of growth of unit labour costs
was increasing as a result of workers’ rising aspirations and a slowdown in the
trend rate of productivity growth.26 As shown in Figure 2, the initial combined
effect of the new ‘market power’ institutional regime that emerged from the
breakdown of the post-war social bargains and the fundamentals embodied in
the wage and price regimes was thus a higher wage share and a higher rate of
inflation – the latter exacerbated by the post-1973 productivity slowdown. These
outcomes are clearly evident in the data in the second column of Table 1.
Although Figure 2 characterizes the 1970s as a conditional equilibrium
resulting from the combination of a particular institutional regime with the wage
and price regimes outlined in Section 3, it must be noted that this conditional
equilibrium is not a ‘fully adjusted’ position. This is because, as a result of the
specific historical conditions described above, it involves ω∗ = ωF > ωF , where
the latter denotes the wage share that (other things being equal) is uniquely
consistent with firms’ target rate of return, rT .27 Firms thus have an incentive to
25 The US balance of trade, having been permanently in surplus since the end of World War II, dwindled
during the late 1960s and has been more or less permanently in deficit since 1971.
26 This productivity slowdown is clearly shown in the second and third columns of Table 1, and its
inflationary implications are illustrated in Figure 2, wherein – consistent with equation (9) – a reduction
in the trend rate of productivity growth results in a higher rate of inflation associated with any given rate
of growth of nominal wages. The post-1973 productivity slowdown is taken as given in the discussion in
this paper. See, however, Bowles et al. (1990) and Setterfield and Cornwall (2002) for attempts to explain
the productivity slowdown in terms of much the same institutional changes that are the focus of attention
above.
27 In terms of the relationship between the rate of profit and the wage share discussed in the previous
section, in Figure 2 we have
r∗ =

(1 − ω∗ )un
v

=



(1 − ωF )un
v

<

(1 − ωF )un
v

= rT

(Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we are overlooking here any possible impact of the wage share on
the rate of capacity utilization and hence the realized rate of profit that might eliminate the incongruity
between the actual and target rates of return. Even were we to allow for such effects, the notion that
Figure 2 illustrates a less than fully adjusted position might still be justified if firms care innately about
realizing their target wage share on the basis of a sense of distributive justice.) In effect, the equilibrium
wage share (and hence profit rate) outcome in Figure 2 is based on the ‘transitory’ price regime
p = ϕ1 (ω − ωF ) + ϕ2 (w − q)
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seek further changes to the configuration of the economy depicted in Figure 2 in
an effort to re-establish a wage share consistent with their target rate of return.
This brings us to the reaction of firms – and the state – to the aspiration
inflation with which we commenced our discussion of the post-1973 period.
One widely documented aspect of this response was that of the state, which
initially took the form of restrictive macroeconomic policies (Bowles et al., 1990;
Cornwall, 1990; Cornwall and Cornwall, 2001; Epstein and Schor, 1990). This
response was designed to raise the rate of unemployment and thus (per equations
(3), (4), (10), and (11)) diminish inflation by lowering the bargaining power
and wage-share aspirations of workers. In view of what was said above about
the conjunction of historical circumstances that gave rise to the increase in the
target wage share of firms depicted in Figure 2, it is to be expected that these
developments would have alleviated the pressure on firms to keep the target
wage share as high as ωF . The third column of Table 1 is consistent with the
workings out of this policy response during the 1980s. In particular, it draws
attention to the combination of rising unemployment (which actually began in
the 1970s) coupled with falling inflation and a falling wage share of income.
However, Table 1 suggests that the restrictive macroeconomic policies pursued
during the 1970s and 1980s were only partially successful as a response to the
post-1973 macroeconomic regime depicted in Figure 2. In the first case, it shows
that the wage share remained high – above the 1960–73 value associated with a
fully adjusted conditional equilibrium. Second, the pursuit of restrictive policies
involved a macroeconomic trade-off, in which real macroeconomic performance
was sacrificed in order to alleviate inflationary pressures and relieve the profit
squeeze on US firms. Hence Table 1 reveals the costs of restrictive macroeconomic
policies to have been a sharp increase in unemployment to almost 150% of its
1960–73 value during the 1980s.28
This leads us to the second aspect of the corporate/state response to the
macroeconomic regime of the 1970s, which is evident in the last row of Table 1:
a series of initiatives designed to raise the value of S in equations (3) and (4)
and thus reduce the willingness and ability of workers to press for nominal
wage increases by increasing worker income and employment insecurity. This
strategy has been corporate-led, and has involved changing the conventions of
the employment relation in order to diminish both the bargaining power and the
aspirations of workers.29 It has included (inter alia) deunionization initiatives,
increases in corporate downsizing exercises, plant relocation, and increases in
where ϕ 2 < 1 captures the inability of firms to fully index price inflation to the rate of growth of unit
labour costs under the historically specific conditions prevalent during the early 1970s.
28 See Cornwall and Cornwall (2001) and Setterfield and Cornwall (2002) for the argument
that depressed aggregate demand conditions also contributed to the continued poor performance of
productivity growth that is evident in the third column of Table 1.
29 According to Setterfield and Lovejoy (2006), the adversarial and confrontational nature of corporate
contributions to the post-1973 ‘market power’ institutional regime are such that we can expect to observe
ωS < 0 in equation (4).
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the quantity of non-standard (part-time and temporary) work, in the pursuit of
some of which corporations have been aided by changes in formal institutions
brought about by the actions of the state. Hence changes in US labour law created
a legal environment that made it easier for firms to engage in deunionization
initiatives during the 1980s (Block et al., 1996: 28–33), with the result that union
membership in the US has since fallen steadily from over 25% of private-sector
employees during the mid 1970s to barely 10% by the mid-1990s (Palley, 1998:
32). At the same time, periodic downsizing exercises – which create a threat
to workers’ employment and income security regardless of general economic
performance – have become the norm. Osterman (1999: 38–40) shows that by the
mid-1990s, the number of layoffs in the US accounted for by ‘structural change’
surpassed the number due to poor firm performance. Similarly – as first discussed
by Bluestone and Harrison (1982) – plant relocation has become an omnipresent
threat. Between 1967 and 1991, the share of manufacturing employment in the
‘rust belt’ states of the US fell from 48.6% to 36.2%, the share of states in the
South and West increasing from 37.0% to 50.2% over the same period (Crandall,
1993: 12). Apart from its contribution to the process of deunionization reported
above, the extent of this relocation – coupled with its internationalization in the
age of multinational corporations – has created a credible threat that both directly
reduces the security of workers and indirectly reduces this security by diminishing
the efficacy of strike activity and union organizing drives (Palley, 1998: 34–
35; Bronfenbrenner, 2000).30 Finally, increases in non-standard employment
arrangements have reduced the employment security of those desirous of year
round, full-time work, and who now face a reduced likelihood of obtaining such
work in the event of dismissal from their current employment (Osterman, 1999:
54–60, 85–88). These developments are captured by the monotonic rise of the
index of worker insecurity reported in the last row of Table 1.31
In short, in response to the macroeconomic regime prevalent in the US during
the 1970s and 1980s, there has occurred a constellation of institutional changes
that have diminished worker employment and income security independently
of the performance of the aggregate labour market, as measured by the rate
of unemployment. The consequences of this are illustrated in Figure 3 below,
and are also evident in the data in the final column of Table 1. Figure 3 first
shows a decline in both the bargaining power (from µ to µ ) and wage share

to ωW ) of workers as a result of the institutional changes
aspirations (from ωW
detailed above, which are manifest in an increase in S in equations (3) and (4).32
Consistent with equations (10) and (11), this will reduce inflationary pressures,
30 See also Dreher and Gaston (2005) for evidence of the link between globalization and deunionization.
31 This index is the unweighted average of the transformed values of several variables that either reflect
or affect worker insecurity, including trade union membership, the extent of part time employment, and
the number of work stoppages per annum. See Setterfield (2005: 167, 170–71) for further discussion of
both the components and calculation of the index of worker insecurity reported in Table 1.
32 Recall that the particular rise in S contemplated here is consistent with ωS < 0 in equation (4).
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Figure 3. An incomes policy based on fear
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at the same time alleviating the need for firms to maintain an elevated target
wage share. This latter development is captured by the fall in firms’ target wage
share from ωF to ωF in Figure 3, making the conditional equilibrium depicted in
Figure 3 a fully adjusted position.33 The result of these developments, as
illustrated in Figure 3, is a fall in both the rate of wage inflation and the wage
share of income, the former resulting in a decline in price inflation enhanced by
the improvement of trend productivity growth to something like its value during
the Golden Age. The upshot of all this is the restoration of a rate of inflation
and distribution of income comparable to those achieved during the Golden
Age, all without sacrificing employment. More precisely, the contention here is
that by the 1990s, the institutional regime of the US economy again involved
an incomes policy in the sense defined earlier, which operated by raising the
value of S in equations (3) and (4) and thus reducing both the willingness and
ability of workers to press for nominal wage increases, regardless of the market
power seemingly vested in them by a low rate of unemployment. This incomes
policy again alleviated the inflation constraint on the US economy – the need
to sacrifice growth and employment in order to raise U, lower µ and ωW in
33 Referring back to the ‘transitory’ price regime p = ϕ1 (ω − ωF ) + ϕ2 (w − q)used to discuss outcomes
in Figure 2 above, we now have ϕ 2 = 1 again as a result of firms having successfully ‘passed on’
the pressures of globalized commodity markets to workers. Essentially what we are postulating is that
globalization has an initial effect on firms (captured by ϕ 2 < 1 in the ‘transitory’ price regime) that does
not persist: as firms (aided by the state) find ways of reducing µ and/or ωW in the wage regime, this so
moderates unit labour cost growth (w − q) as to permit a return to the full indexing of the latter into p
(i.e., ϕ 2 = 1).
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equations (3) and (4), and hence reduce inflation in (9) – facilitating, in turn, the
reconciliation of rapid growth and low unemployment with low rates of inflation
and a distribution of income acceptable to firms. These are, of course, precisely
the macroeconomic outcomes observed in the final column of Table 1.
5. Conclusion
According to the vision articulated in this paper, at any point in time we can
conceive of the macroeconomic ‘data generating process’ as consisting of a set of
fundamentals embedded in a relatively enduring institutional framework – the
latter subject to discontinuous change over time, partly in response to the very
conditional equilibrium macroeconomic outcomes to which it gives rise. This
furnishes a conception of the long run as comprising an evolutionary sequence
of discrete ‘episodes’ of macroeconomic performance (the defining structural
characteristic of each episode being a specific institutional framework), rather
than as a path-independent trend from which there are but temporary departures
caused by independent and transitory shocks.
In this paper, the vision of macroeconomics described above has been used
to create a model of inflation comprising wage and price regimes consistent
with a conflicting claims view of the inflation process. This model is rendered
conditionally closed (resulting in a conditional equilibrium solution) by the
identification of the precise institutional regime within which, during some
particular interval of historical time, the wage and price regimes are embedded.
The result is a tripartite periodization of the US economy into three distinct
‘episodes’ of macroeconomic performance (1960–73, 1974–89, 1990–2000)
based on three distinct institutional regimes. Crucial to the thesis advanced at
the start of this paper, the first and third of these institutional regimes have been
identified as featuring incomes policies – formal and/or informal institutions
that frame and mediate aggregate wage and price setting behaviour in such a
way as to reduce conflict over income shares and better reconcile conflicting
income claims – that have given rise to similar macroeconomic outcomes and
which, in conjunction with the institutional features of the intervening episode,
help to explain the recent evolution of the US economy through successive
episodes of low, high, and low inflation. The incomes policies that ‘bookend’
the past 50 years of US macroeconomic performance differ profoundly in their
structural features. Hence, whilst the limited capital–labour accord was a model
of cooperation and conciliation in which conflict was ameliorated through
consensus building, the constellation of institutions identified with the most
recent institutional regime comprise an ‘incomes policy based on fear’ (Cornwall,
1990) – a model of domination in which conflict is ameliorated essentially by
means of coercion and in which the costs of better reconciling distributional
conflict and reducing inflationary pressures fall squarely on the shoulders of
workers. Nevertheless, both achieve – albeit in radically different ways – the

The rise, decline and rise of incomes policies in the US during the post-war era 145

reduction of distributional conflict characteristic of incomes policies and it is
because of this that the US economy can ultimately be said to have experienced
the rise, decline, and rise of incomes policies over the past 50 years.

References
Akerlof, G. (2002), ‘Behavioral macroeconomics and macroeconomic behavior’, American
Economic Review, 92: 411–433.
Block, R. N., J. Beck, and D. H. Kruger (1996), Labor Law, Industrial Relations and Employee
Choice, Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Blueston, B. and B. Harrison (1982), The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings,
Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry, New York: Basic
Books.
Bowles, S., D. M. Gordon, and T. E. Weisskopf (1990), After the Waste Land, Armonk, NY:
T. E. Sharpe.
Boyer, R. (1990), The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction, New York: Columbia
University Press.
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2000), ‘Uneasy terrain: the impact of capital mobility on workers, wages
and union organizing’, Report to the US Trade Deficit Review Commission.
Burdekin, R. C. K. and P. Burkett (1996), Distributional Conflict and Inflation: Theoretical
and Historical Perspectives, London: Macmillan.
Chick, V. and M. Caserta (1997), ‘Provisional equilibrium and macroeconomic theory’, in
P. Arestis, G. Palma, and M. Sawyer (eds), Markets, Unemployment and Economic
Policy: Essays in Honour of Geoff Harcourt, Vol. II, London: Routledge.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler (1999), ‘The science of monetary policy: a new Keynesian
perspective’, Journal of Economic Literature, 37: 1661–1707.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler (2000), ‘Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic
stability: evidence and some theory’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 147–
180.
Cornwall, J. (1990), The Theory of Economic Breakdown: An Institutional-Analytical
Approach, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Cornwall, J. and W. Cornwall (2001), Capitalist Development in the Twentieth Century,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crandall, R. W. (1993), Manufacturing on the Move, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Crotty, J. (1994), ‘Are Keynesian uncertainty and macrotheory compatible? Conventional
decision making, institutional structures and conditional stability in Keynesian
macromodels’, in G. Dymski and R. Pollin (eds), New Perspectives in Monetary
Macroeconomics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Collard, F. and H. Dellas (2004), ‘The great inflation of the 1970s’, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Paper No. 799
Dreher, A. and N. Gaston (2005), ‘Has globalisation really had no effect on unions?’ Swiss
Institute for Business Cycle Research, Working Paper No. 110
Dutt, A. K. (1994), ‘Analytical political economy: an introduction’, in A. K. Dutt (ed.), New
Directions in Analytical Political Economy, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Epstein, G. and J. Schor (1990), ‘Macropolicy in the rise and fall of the Golden Age’, in S. A.
Marglin and J. B. Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Post
War Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

146

MARK SETTERFIELD

Glyn, A. A. Hughes A. Lipietz, and A. Singh (1990), ‘The rise and fall of the Golden Age’, in
S. A. Marglin and J. B. Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the
Post War Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hunt, A. (2002), ‘Incomes policy’, in B. Snowdon and H. R. Vane (eds), An Encyclopedia of
Macroeconomics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Kahneman, D. J. L. Knetsch, and R. Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking:
entitlements in the market’, American Economic Review, 76: 728–741.
Kalecki, M. (1971), ‘Costs and prices’, in Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kotz, D. M., T. McDonough, and M. Reich (eds), (1994), Social Structures of Accumulation:
The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kregel, J. (1976), ‘Economic methodology in the face of uncertainty’, Economic Journal, 86:
209–225.
Lavoie, M. (1992), Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis, Aldershot: Edward
Elgar.
Lee, F. (1998), Post-Keynesian Pricing Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maddison, A. (1991), Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: A Long-Run Comparative
View, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marglin S. A and J. B. Schor (eds) (1990), The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the
Post War Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Orphanides, A. and J. C. Williams (2004), ‘The decline of activist stabilization policy: natural
rate misperceptions, learning and expectations’, European Central Bank Working Paper
No. 337.
Osterman, P. (1999), Securing Prosperity: The American Labor Market: How It Has Changed
and What to Do about It, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Palley, T. I. (1998), Plenty of Nothing: The Downsizing of the American Dream and the Case
for Structural Keynesianism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Palley, T. I. (2006), ‘A Post Keynesian framework for monetary policy: why interest rate
operating procedures are not enough’, in L. P. Rochon and C. Gnos (eds), Economic
Policies: Perspectives from the Keynesian Heterodoxy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Setterfield, M. (1997), ‘Should economists dispense with the notion of equilibrium?’, Journal
of Post Keynesian Economics, 20: 47–76.
Setterfield, M. (2003), ‘Critical realism and formal modelling: incompatible bedfellows?’,
in P. Downward (ed.), Applied Economics and the Critical Realist Critique, London:
Routledge.
Setterfield, M. (2005), ‘Interactions in analytical political economy: an introduction’, in
M. Setterfield (ed.), Interactions in Analytical Political Economy: Theory, Policy and
Applications, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Setterfield, M. and J. Cornwall (2002), ‘A neo-Kaldorian perspective on the rise and decline
of the Golden Age’, in M. A. Setterfield (ed.), The Economics of Demand-Led Growth:
Challenging the Supply Side Vision of the Long Run, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Setterfield, M. and T. Lovejoy (2006), ‘Aspirations, bargaining power and macroeconomic
performance’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 29: 117–148.
Taylor, L. (2004), Reconstructing Macroeconomics: Structuralist Proposals and Critiques of
the Mainstream, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

